Washington’s Real Crisis Isn’t Partisanship—It’s Basic Competence
The loud fights dominate the news. The expensive failures happen quietly—in backlogs, payment errors, broken IT, and disaster aid that arrives too late.
By TheMurrow Editorial
January 25, 2026
Key Points
- 1Follow GAO’s Feb. 25, 2025 High-Risk List: 38 recurring breakdowns show Washington’s core failure is execution, not ideology.
- 2Treat improper payments as a governing test: $162B in FY2024 signals persistent control gaps despite declines tied to pandemic programs ending.
- 3Demand working systems: $100B+ annual federal IT spending and a $606B net tax gap show capacity, not rhetoric, drives public trust.
Washington’s loudest fights happen on cable news. Washington’s most expensive failures happen in silence.
A family waits months for a benefits determination. A contractor bills for a system that never quite works. A local government tries to navigate disaster assistance rules while clocks, deadlines, and public patience run out. None of this makes for clean partisan theater, but it is where faith in government is actually won or lost.
The deepest problem in federal governance right now is not a shortage of ideas, or even the intensity of polarization. It’s institutional competence—the basic ability to execute what elected leaders already decided, reliably and at scale.
The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office (GAO) offers a bracing yardstick. In its High-Risk List updated February 25, 2025, GAO identifies 38 areas across the federal government vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or in need of transformation. That list isn’t a headline about “government failing.” It’s a set of measurable breakdowns—backlogs, payment errors, procurement failures—that keep recurring no matter which party holds power.
“Partisanship can paralyze policy. Incompetence breaks the machinery even when policy is clear.”
— — TheMurrow Editorial
Key Points
Track competence, not cable-news conflict: GAO’s Feb. 25, 2025 High-Risk List names 38 recurring management breakdowns across administrations.
Treat execution as a core democratic test: backlogs, payment errors, and IT overruns persist even when policy goals are bipartisan.
Follow measurable signals of capacity: $162B improper payments (FY2024), a $606B net tax gap (TY2022), and $100B+ annual IT spending.
Treat execution as a core democratic test: backlogs, payment errors, and IT overruns persist even when policy goals are bipartisan.
Follow measurable signals of capacity: $162B improper payments (FY2024), a $606B net tax gap (TY2022), and $100B+ annual IT spending.
Competence is state capacity, not civility
Political journalism often treats dysfunction as a problem of tone: too much anger, too little compromise. Civility matters, but it doesn’t pay claims, patch systems, or reconcile accounts. A more useful definition of competence is operational and concrete.
A practical definition readers can test against experience
Call it state capacity: the federal government’s ability to do five things consistently:
- Staff core functions with the right skills and continuity
- Procure and run IT and infrastructure without chronic overruns and breakdowns
- Pay and collect money accurately, with minimal error and fraud exposure
- Deliver services predictably—on time, with clear rules, and functional customer support
- Sustain oversight and accountability loops so mistakes get fixed, not repeated
Competence failures show up in the places citizens touch: delayed decisions, outages, backlogs, errors, and implementation breakdowns. Those symptoms can persist even when elected officials agree on goals. A program can be popular on both sides of the aisle and still be administered poorly.
- Staff core functions with the right skills and continuity
- Procure and run IT and infrastructure without chronic overruns and breakdowns
- Pay and collect money accurately, with minimal error and fraud exposure
- Deliver services predictably—on time, with clear rules, and functional customer support
- Sustain oversight and accountability loops so mistakes get fixed, not repeated
Competence failures show up in the places citizens touch: delayed decisions, outages, backlogs, errors, and implementation breakdowns. Those symptoms can persist even when elected officials agree on goals. A program can be popular on both sides of the aisle and still be administered poorly.
Why this matters more than the day’s political fight
Washington can survive a noisy argument. Democracies are built to tolerate disagreement. What democracies struggle to survive is a government that cannot execute basic tasks at scale. When administrative capacity frays, every policy promise becomes suspect—whether it’s an expansion of benefits, a crackdown on fraud, or a new investment plan.
Competence is not an aesthetic preference. It’s a prerequisite.
Competence is not an aesthetic preference. It’s a prerequisite.
Key Insight
A government can be ideologically polarized and still functional. What becomes corrosive is when the machinery can’t deliver decisions reliably—no matter who wins elections.
GAO’s High-Risk List: a nonpartisan map of recurring failure
If you want to argue about government competence without turning it into a culture war, GAO is the place to start. GAO is Congress’s watchdog, and its High-Risk List (Feb 25, 2025) is one of the most authoritative inventories of persistent management trouble in the federal system.
What the High-Risk List measures
GAO flags areas where federal programs and operations are vulnerable to:
- fraud, waste, and abuse
- mismanagement
- or require transformation to function effectively
The scale is hard to dismiss. GAO reports that efforts to address high-risk issues have produced nearly $759 billion in savings over roughly 19 years (GAO’s accounting across fiscal years 2006–2024). That figure is more than a budget trivia question. It’s evidence that competence improvements can yield real, bankable outcomes.
- fraud, waste, and abuse
- mismanagement
- or require transformation to function effectively
The scale is hard to dismiss. GAO reports that efforts to address high-risk issues have produced nearly $759 billion in savings over roughly 19 years (GAO’s accounting across fiscal years 2006–2024). That figure is more than a budget trivia question. It’s evidence that competence improvements can yield real, bankable outcomes.
“GAO’s High-Risk List is a catalog of governance where the problem isn’t ideology—it’s execution.”
— — TheMurrow Editorial
Progress exists—and so does backsliding
GAO’s 2025 update offers a mixed picture:
- Since the 2023 update, GAO notes progress in 10 areas, generating about $84 billion in financial benefits.
- 25 areas maintained their status—meaning the underlying risk remains.
- 3 areas regressed, including DOD weapon systems acquisition, IT acquisitions/management, and federal real property.
- GAO added one new area: improving delivery of federal disaster assistance.
None of that reads like a government in freefall. It reads like a government that struggles to institutionalize improvement—able to push forward in some pockets while sliding backward in others.
- Since the 2023 update, GAO notes progress in 10 areas, generating about $84 billion in financial benefits.
- 25 areas maintained their status—meaning the underlying risk remains.
- 3 areas regressed, including DOD weapon systems acquisition, IT acquisitions/management, and federal real property.
- GAO added one new area: improving delivery of federal disaster assistance.
None of that reads like a government in freefall. It reads like a government that struggles to institutionalize improvement—able to push forward in some pockets while sliding backward in others.
An expert diagnosis, in GAO’s own framing
GAO’s press materials repeatedly urge “attention” to the list because it offers a pathway to “save billions” and improve effectiveness. Treat that as a managerial diagnosis, not a talking point: a well-run system reduces the need for heroic interventions and emergency fixes.
38 areas
GAO’s High-Risk List (updated Feb. 25, 2025) identifies 38 federal areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement—or needing transformation.
$759B
GAO reports nearly $759 billion in savings over about 19 years (FY2006–FY2024) from efforts to address high-risk issues.
Paying wrongly is governing wrongly: improper payments as a competence test
A government’s most basic promise is that it can move money correctly: collect what is owed under the law and pay what it commits to pay—no more, no less. When that breaks down, trust doesn’t just erode. It becomes irrational.
GAO tracks one of the clearest indicators of operational control: improper payments, a category that includes overpayments, underpayments, and payments that should not have been made or couldn’t be properly documented.
GAO tracks one of the clearest indicators of operational control: improper payments, a category that includes overpayments, underpayments, and payments that should not have been made or couldn’t be properly documented.
The numbers are large—and revealing
GAO reports:
- FY 2023: $236 billion in improper payments across 71 programs at 14 agencies; about $175 billion (74%) were overpayments.
- FY 2024: about $162 billion in improper payments across 68 programs at 16 agencies; about $135 billion (~84%) were overpayments.
These aren’t abstract accounting entries. They represent real dollars that either didn’t reach the right people, reached them late, or went where they shouldn’t have—often forcing later clawbacks, audits, and administrative burden that punishes compliant recipients while fraudsters keep moving.
- FY 2023: $236 billion in improper payments across 71 programs at 14 agencies; about $175 billion (74%) were overpayments.
- FY 2024: about $162 billion in improper payments across 68 programs at 16 agencies; about $135 billion (~84%) were overpayments.
These aren’t abstract accounting entries. They represent real dollars that either didn’t reach the right people, reached them late, or went where they shouldn’t have—often forcing later clawbacks, audits, and administrative burden that punishes compliant recipients while fraudsters keep moving.
“If you can’t pay accurately, you can’t govern.”
— — TheMurrow Editorial
A fair reading: improvement may be real, but not structural
The FY 2024 drop is significant. GAO’s press release, however, adds a crucial caveat: the decline is attributed largely to the winding down or termination of pandemic-era programs. That nuance matters because it separates headline improvement from system improvement.
A program sunset can reduce error volume without strengthening the underlying payment controls. Readers should resist the temptation—common in Washington—to treat a better number as proof that the machinery has been repaired.
A program sunset can reduce error volume without strengthening the underlying payment controls. Readers should resist the temptation—common in Washington—to treat a better number as proof that the machinery has been repaired.
Concentration risk: the same few pressure points
GAO notes improper payments are concentrated in a small set of program areas (cited in GAO press materials, including major benefit and tax-credit programs). Concentration can be good news if it focuses reform. Concentration can also be bad news if it means the same vulnerabilities persist where the money is largest and the rules are hardest to administer.
$162B
GAO reports about $162 billion in improper payments in FY2024—still a massive operational-control signal even after pandemic programs wound down.
The tax gap: competence on the revenue side
Improper payments are money going out wrong. The tax gap is money not coming in as the law intends. Together, they form a kind of institutional X-ray: whether the government can reconcile obligations in both directions.
GAO’s press materials highlighting the 2025 High-Risk List point to the Internal Revenue Service’s projection of a $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022—the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on time.
GAO’s press materials highlighting the 2025 High-Risk List point to the Internal Revenue Service’s projection of a $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022—the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid on time.
What the tax gap signals—and what it doesn’t
A tax gap is not a moral verdict about taxpayers. It’s a measure of administrative reach: compliance, enforcement capacity, information reporting, and the ability to resolve disputes efficiently.
Multiple interpretations coexist, and readers deserve both:
- One view treats the tax gap as evidence of insufficient enforcement and outdated systems, undermining fairness for those who do pay on time.
- Another view warns that closing gaps through aggressive enforcement can create burdens on compliant filers, especially if systems and guidance are unclear.
- A third view argues that complexity itself generates noncompliance—meaning competence requires simplification as much as enforcement.
Those perspectives all point back to a shared requirement: the IRS must be able to execute whatever Congress sets as policy—accurately and predictably.
Multiple interpretations coexist, and readers deserve both:
- One view treats the tax gap as evidence of insufficient enforcement and outdated systems, undermining fairness for those who do pay on time.
- Another view warns that closing gaps through aggressive enforcement can create burdens on compliant filers, especially if systems and guidance are unclear.
- A third view argues that complexity itself generates noncompliance—meaning competence requires simplification as much as enforcement.
Those perspectives all point back to a shared requirement: the IRS must be able to execute whatever Congress sets as policy—accurately and predictably.
Why this is a public trust issue, not a niche accounting debate
When the government struggles to collect what is owed, lawmakers face pressure to borrow more, cut services, or raise rates elsewhere. Each choice carries political costs and distributional conflict. A capable revenue system doesn’t solve those conflicts, but it keeps them honest: it ensures debates are about policy preferences, not administrative leakage.
$606B
GAO highlights an IRS projection of a $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022—taxes owed versus paid on time.
Federal IT: $100 billion a year and chronic underperformance
Competence isn’t only about rules. It’s about tools. In modern government, the most important tool is software—eligibility systems, payment platforms, cybersecurity, procurement databases, and internal controls that prevent waste before it happens.
GAO states the federal government invests more than $100 billion annually in information technology. Yet GAO also notes that IT investments have often failed or cost more and taken longer than expected for decades.
GAO states the federal government invests more than $100 billion annually in information technology. Yet GAO also notes that IT investments have often failed or cost more and taken longer than expected for decades.
The “recommendation gap” as a quiet scandal
Since 2010, GAO reports it has made more than 1,800 recommendations on IT. That number is a signal in itself. It suggests the problem isn’t a one-time lapse. It’s repeated difficulty turning lessons into standard practice.
In other words, Washington doesn’t just have technical debt. It has institutional debt—accumulated promises to fix governance that don’t fully convert into durable capability.
In other words, Washington doesn’t just have technical debt. It has institutional debt—accumulated promises to fix governance that don’t fully convert into durable capability.
Competing explanations—none fully exculpatory
Three broad camps tend to explain federal IT failure differently:
- Procurement and oversight critics argue acquisition rules and risk aversion produce bloated contracts and slow delivery.
- Capacity advocates argue agencies lack enough in-house technical talent to manage vendors and set requirements intelligently.
- Skeptics of centralization argue one-size-fits-all mandates can backfire across agencies with different missions.
GAO’s work doesn’t require picking a single culprit. It points to a consistent result: high spending without reliable performance.
- Procurement and oversight critics argue acquisition rules and risk aversion produce bloated contracts and slow delivery.
- Capacity advocates argue agencies lack enough in-house technical talent to manage vendors and set requirements intelligently.
- Skeptics of centralization argue one-size-fits-all mandates can backfire across agencies with different missions.
GAO’s work doesn’t require picking a single culprit. It points to a consistent result: high spending without reliable performance.
Editor’s Note
The article’s throughline is not “government is too big” or “government is too small,” but that high spending without reliable execution is an accountability failure.
Disaster assistance joins the high-risk list: a case study in modern expectations
GAO’s 2025 High-Risk List added a new area: improving delivery of federal disaster assistance. That addition should be read as a warning about the mismatch between contemporary needs and legacy administrative capacity.
Why disaster delivery exposes institutional weakness
Disaster programs stress-test government in ways ordinary administration does not:
- High volume under urgent timelines
- Coordination across federal, state, and local actors
- Complex eligibility rules under emotional, politically charged conditions
- Public scrutiny that spikes when systems slow down
Failures here aren’t only financial. They are reputational. People judge the state by how it behaves during crisis, not during routine operations.
- High volume under urgent timelines
- Coordination across federal, state, and local actors
- Complex eligibility rules under emotional, politically charged conditions
- Public scrutiny that spikes when systems slow down
Failures here aren’t only financial. They are reputational. People judge the state by how it behaves during crisis, not during routine operations.
The competence lens clarifies the political argument
Some readers will see “disaster assistance” and think the debate is about spending levels. Others will see it as a debate about fraud controls. Both matter. The competence lens adds a third dimension: can the government process claims, verify eligibility, and deliver support in a way that is both fast and accurate?
Speed without controls invites abuse. Controls without speed become cruelty. Competence is the balance—and the ability to deliver it consistently, not just in exceptional moments.
Speed without controls invites abuse. Controls without speed become cruelty. Competence is the balance—and the ability to deliver it consistently, not just in exceptional moments.
Oversight that works: competence as a feedback loop
One reason the competence problem persists is that Washington often treats oversight as a weapon rather than a tool. Hearings become clips. Reports become ammunition. The actual work—closing gaps, building systems, staffing roles—happens slowly, if it happens at all.
GAO’s body of work offers a different model: measurable indicators, recurring audits, and recommendations that can be tracked over time.
GAO’s body of work offers a different model: measurable indicators, recurring audits, and recommendations that can be tracked over time.
What GAO’s savings figure really implies
GAO reports nearly $759 billion in savings over about 19 years from efforts to address high-risk issues. Readers shouldn’t interpret that as GAO single-handedly “saving money.” Savings reflect agencies and lawmakers acting on oversight findings.
The implication is practical: when oversight is treated as a management function rather than a partisan spectacle, it can produce results large enough to matter in fiscal policy.
The implication is practical: when oversight is treated as a management function rather than a partisan spectacle, it can produce results large enough to matter in fiscal policy.
Practical takeaways for policymakers—and for readers
Competence isn’t abstract. It can be pursued with specific habits:
- Make performance visible: publish metrics on backlogs, processing times, and error rates that citizens can understand.
- Prioritize repeatable fixes: reduce the “pilot project” culture and build systems that agencies can maintain.
- Invest in implementation capacity: staffing and training matter as much as legislation.
- Close the loop: treat GAO recommendations as a living to-do list with deadlines and accountability.
Readers can apply the same filter to political promises: not “Do I like the idea?” but “Can the system deliver it without chronic error?”
- Make performance visible: publish metrics on backlogs, processing times, and error rates that citizens can understand.
- Prioritize repeatable fixes: reduce the “pilot project” culture and build systems that agencies can maintain.
- Invest in implementation capacity: staffing and training matter as much as legislation.
- Close the loop: treat GAO recommendations as a living to-do list with deadlines and accountability.
Readers can apply the same filter to political promises: not “Do I like the idea?” but “Can the system deliver it without chronic error?”
A competence filter for political promises
- ✓Ask how it will be implemented, not just what it intends
- ✓Look for published metrics on backlogs, processing times, and error rates
- ✓Demand repeatable fixes over one-off pilots
- ✓Track whether oversight recommendations are closed with deadlines and accountability
A competence agenda that doesn’t require ideological agreement
Competence is one of the few governance goals that can unite people who agree on little else. Conservatives want stewardship, fraud reduction, and predictable administration. Progressives want benefits delivered fairly, rights enforced consistently, and public systems that work for ordinary people. Moderates want stability.
The obstacle is not lack of consensus on the value of competence. The obstacle is that competence work is rarely glamorous.
The obstacle is not lack of consensus on the value of competence. The obstacle is that competence work is rarely glamorous.
The honest trade-offs
A competence agenda forces choices that partisans often avoid:
- Faster delivery can increase risk unless controls improve.
- Tighter controls can slow delivery unless systems modernize.
- Modernization requires upfront cost, patience, and managerial discipline.
- Oversight can feel punitive unless paired with support for execution.
The point isn’t to pretend these tensions vanish. The point is to build institutions that manage them predictably.
- Faster delivery can increase risk unless controls improve.
- Tighter controls can slow delivery unless systems modernize.
- Modernization requires upfront cost, patience, and managerial discipline.
- Oversight can feel punitive unless paired with support for execution.
The point isn’t to pretend these tensions vanish. The point is to build institutions that manage them predictably.
What to watch next
GAO’s 2025 High-Risk List offers a clear reading list for citizens who want to track whether Washington is getting better at governing:
- Are areas on the list retiring because problems are solved, or simply because attention shifts?
- Do improper payment totals fall because controls improve—or because temporary programs end?
- Does federal IT spending translate into systems that work reliably?
Competence is measurable. That’s the best news in this entire story.
- Are areas on the list retiring because problems are solved, or simply because attention shifts?
- Do improper payment totals fall because controls improve—or because temporary programs end?
- Does federal IT spending translate into systems that work reliably?
Competence is measurable. That’s the best news in this entire story.
Conclusion: the republic runs on implementation
Washington will keep arguing about values. It should; politics is the arena where values clash and compromise. The quieter question is whether the federal government can execute the decisions that emerge from that arena.
GAO’s work provides a sobering but usable mirror: 38 high-risk areas (Feb 2025), $162 billion in improper payments in FY 2024, more than $100 billion in annual IT spending with persistent failures, and a projected $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022. Those figures describe capacity, not rhetoric.
Competence doesn’t make government bigger or smaller by itself. It makes government more real—more capable of doing what it says it will do, and more accountable when it fails. A democracy can survive disagreement. It struggles when its institutions can’t reliably perform the basics.
The case for competence is not technocratic. It is moral: stewardship of public money, fairness in enforcement, and reliability in the services that shape citizens’ daily lives.
GAO’s work provides a sobering but usable mirror: 38 high-risk areas (Feb 2025), $162 billion in improper payments in FY 2024, more than $100 billion in annual IT spending with persistent failures, and a projected $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022. Those figures describe capacity, not rhetoric.
Competence doesn’t make government bigger or smaller by itself. It makes government more real—more capable of doing what it says it will do, and more accountable when it fails. A democracy can survive disagreement. It struggles when its institutions can’t reliably perform the basics.
The case for competence is not technocratic. It is moral: stewardship of public money, fairness in enforcement, and reliability in the services that shape citizens’ daily lives.
T
About the Author
TheMurrow Editorial is a writer for TheMurrow covering opinion.
Frequently Asked Questions
What does “institutional competence” mean in federal governance?
Institutional competence refers to the federal government’s ability to execute core tasks reliably: staffing, procurement, IT operations, accurate payments and collections, service delivery, and effective oversight. The concept is less about political “tone” and more about whether systems produce predictable outcomes—few errors, manageable backlogs, functional technology, and clear accountability when failures occur.
What is GAO’s High-Risk List, and why does it matter?
GAO’s High-Risk List (updated Feb. 25, 2025) identifies 38 areas vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or needing transformation. It matters because it’s a nonpartisan framework that tracks persistent operational weaknesses over time. GAO also reports nearly $759 billion in savings over about 19 years from efforts to address high-risk issues.
How big are improper payments, and what do they indicate?
GAO reports $236 billion in improper payments in FY 2023 and about $162 billion in FY 2024. Improper payments are a direct indicator of administrative control: whether agencies can verify eligibility, document decisions, and pay the right amount to the right recipient. The FY 2024 decline is partly attributed to pandemic-era programs winding down, not necessarily systemic reform.
Why does the tax gap matter for competence?
GAO highlights an IRS projection of a $606 billion net tax gap for tax year 2022—taxes owed versus paid on time. The tax gap signals limits in enforcement capacity, compliance systems, and administrative reach. It also affects broader fiscal choices by increasing pressure to borrow more, reduce spending, or raise revenue elsewhere if legal obligations aren’t collected efficiently.
If the government spends over $100 billion on IT, why do systems still fail?
GAO says the federal government invests more than $100 billion annually in IT, yet many projects still fail or run over budget and schedule. GAO has issued 1,800+ IT recommendations since 2010, suggesting recurring weaknesses in acquisition, oversight, technical capacity, and execution. High spending alone doesn’t guarantee performance without strong management and accountability.
Why did GAO add disaster assistance delivery as a high-risk area?
GAO added improving delivery of federal disaster assistance as a new high-risk area in 2025. Disaster programs stress-test government: urgent timelines, complex eligibility, coordination across levels of government, and intense public scrutiny. The designation signals that delivery challenges are persistent enough to merit sustained oversight and management reforms, not one-off fixes.
