Nations Agree to New Maritime Security Pact After Surge in Red Sea Disruptions
After two years of reroutes, rising costs, and uncertainty, coastal states are betting on routine coordination—not improvisation—to stabilize a vital sea lane.
Key Points
- 1Launches an IMO-backed joint operations framework under DCoC/JA to turn regional maritime security promises into routine, coordinated action at sea.
- 2Quantifies the disruption: Egypt estimates $13B in lost Suez fees, while transits recover to ~45/day, still below ~70/day pre-crisis.
- 3Highlights why costs linger: Cape diversions can add ~17 days, and carriers like Maersk are returning cautiously with “first structural” services.
A container ship does not make headlines when it arrives on time. It makes headlines when it doesn’t—when a decision taken in a shipping office in Copenhagen or Singapore ripples outward into grocery prices, factory schedules, and national budgets.
Over the past two years, the Red Sea has been the kind of chokepoint that turns the background hum of global trade into a daily crisis briefing. As attacks and threats pushed many carriers to reroute around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, voyages stretched longer, costs rose, and the world relearned an old lesson: maritime security is not a niche concern. It is the plumbing of modern life.
Now a group of coastal states is trying a different kind of response—less dramatic than warships on patrol, but potentially more durable. In September 2025, signatory states under the Djibouti Code of Conduct / Jeddah Amendment (DCoC/JA) process launched a new framework for joint maritime operations, a roadmap meant to translate policy commitments into coordinated action at sea, according to the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The meeting took place in Mombasa, Kenya (1–4 September 2025), under Working Group 3 on Operational Cooperation and Coordination at Sea.
The timing matters. Public discussion often treats maritime security as a reactive story—responding to the latest surge of disruptions. The DCoC/JA framework reads as something else: an attempt to build operating muscle memory among regional states, so coordination is not improvised in the heat of the next emergency.
Maritime security isn’t solved by a single convoy. It’s solved when coastal states can coordinate routinely—before the crisis hits.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
The Red Sea shock: how a regional threat became a global bill
When Yemen’s Houthi forces began attacking commercial shipping amid the Israel–Gaza war dynamics, carriers faced a grim choice: accept elevated risk, or add time and cost by sailing around the Cape of Good Hope. A Washington Post report captured the scale of the damage to Egypt’s finances: the country has estimated roughly $13 billion in lost Suez Canal fees over two years as traffic fell and ships re-routed. That figure is not an abstraction; it is a direct hit to a major state revenue stream tied to global trade stability. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
The same reporting offers a useful snapshot of how far the system has been knocked off its pre-crisis rhythm. Daily Suez transits reportedly rose from around 35 ships per day to roughly 45 as conditions improved after a ceasefire—yet remained below about 70 ships per day before the crisis. A recovery can be real and still be incomplete; the numbers tell that story. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
Egypt’s response also underscores how maritime disruption becomes domestic policy. The country introduced a 15% fee discount for large vessels and offered added services such as crew changes and medical support to lure ships back. Incentives like these are signals to shipowners: risk is one side of the equation, economics the other. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
The long way around: time as a hidden cost
Add two weeks to a major trade lane and you don’t just move cargo—you move inflation.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
What “a new maritime security pact” most credibly refers to
In September 2025, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) announced the launch of a new framework for joint maritime operations under the DCoC/JA process. The IMO described it as a “roadmap” designed to translate policy commitments into operational cooperation at sea among participating states’ navies, law enforcement bodies, and regulators—supported by international partner organizations. (IMO, September 2025)
The framework was agreed at the inaugural meeting of Working Group 3 on Operational Cooperation and Coordination at Sea, held in Mombasa, Kenya (1–4 September 2025). The IMO said the framework includes all 21 signatory states of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. (IMO, September 2025)
That matters for readers parsing headlines. The DCoC/JA framework is not presented in the IMO’s announcement as a newly signed 2026 treaty with disclosed, binding legal text. It sits under an existing regional instrument, and it emphasizes operational coordination rather than a dramatic new security umbrella.
A pact, but not the kind people imagine
A realistic way to read the “new pact” language is as shorthand for the Mombasa-agreed operational framework—an effort to make cooperation routine rather than ad hoc.
The most valuable security agreement is the one that works on an ordinary Tuesday.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
Why operations matter: the difference between promises and patrol patterns
The IMO’s description of the September 2025 framework is explicit about bridging policy and practice. The roadmap focuses on operational cooperation at sea among state actors that include navies, law enforcement, and regulators. That breadth is not bureaucratic trivia; it reflects how maritime threats present themselves. Piracy, smuggling, and attacks on shipping are simultaneously security incidents, law-enforcement cases, and regulatory problems tied to port states and flag states.
A working operational framework can mean:
- Shared procedures for information exchange and reporting
- Clearer lines for coordination and deconfliction at sea
- Regular joint operations and exercises that create interoperability
- Better alignment between maritime domain awareness and enforcement actions
The IMO also notes support from international partner organizations, suggesting the framework is designed to be resourced and sustained rather than declared and forgotten. (IMO, September 2025)
What operational coordination can mean at sea
- ✓Shared procedures for information exchange and reporting
- ✓Clearer lines for coordination and deconfliction at sea
- ✓Regular joint operations and exercises that create interoperability
- ✓Better alignment between maritime domain awareness and enforcement actions
The Red Sea lesson: security is a system, not a ship
That is why an operational coordination framework, although modest in tone, speaks directly to the structural problem the Red Sea crisis exposed.
The economics of caution: why shipping lines return slowly
The World Shipping Council has emphasized that diversions add up to ~17 days and that returns to the Red Sea have been cautious and partial as 2026 begins. Even if the risk profile improves, shifting services back is operationally complex: schedules must be rebuilt, port calls re-ordered, and contingencies planned. (World Shipping Council)
A report in the Financial Times on Jan. 15, 2026 illustrates the incremental nature of “return.” The FT reported that Maersk implemented what it called a “first structural return” of a service via Suez/Red Sea after “improved stability,” while analysts cautioned that risks remained. That phrasing—first structural return—captures how major carriers frame the move: not a full reset, but a cautious test with room to reverse. (Financial Times, Jan. 15, 2026)
Case study: Egypt’s bid to win back traffic
Yet the transit numbers reported by the Washington Post—~45 ships/day after a recovery, compared with ~70 ships/day pre-crisis—suggest that incentives alone cannot eliminate the “risk premium” that shipping lines still price into the route. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
Key Insight
Multiple perspectives: what regional states, global navies, and industry each want
Coastal and regional states: capacity, sovereignty, legitimacy
- Protecting fisheries and coastal economies
- Combating trafficking and smuggling networks
- Maintaining sovereignty while engaging external partners
A framework rooted in a regional instrument can be more politically palatable than an externally led mission. It signals ownership: local states coordinating as principals rather than as bystanders to great-power deployments.
External partners: stability without permanent escalation
The IMO’s framing of the framework as a roadmap supported by partner organizations suggests a model where external actors enable rather than command. (IMO, September 2025)
Industry: predictability, not rhetoric
Editor's Note
What this means in practice: implications for trade, prices, and policy
The key question is whether the September 2025 DCoC/JA operational framework can help convert shared concern into shared routines. Operational coordination is not glamorous, but it can be decisive: clearer communication, joint planning, and aligned procedures reduce the opportunities for hostile actors to exploit confusion.
Practical takeaways for decision-makers
- Expect partial normalization, not a clean reset. The transit recovery cited by the Washington Post remains below pre-crisis levels. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
- Build lead-time buffers into planning. Diversions can add up to ~17 days, and routing can change quickly. (World Shipping Council)
- Watch carrier behavior, not only headlines. Moves like Maersk’s “first structural return” are more informative than broad declarations of stability. (Financial Times, Jan. 15, 2026)
- Treat regional operational capacity as a leading indicator. A functioning coordination framework among coastal states can reduce risk over time—more sustainably than episodic crisis deployments. (IMO, September 2025)
Decision-maker checklist
- ✓Expect partial normalization, not a clean reset.
- ✓Build lead-time buffers into planning.
- ✓Watch carrier behavior, not only headlines.
- ✓Treat regional operational capacity as a leading indicator.
The credibility test ahead
Still, when global trade depends on a narrow waterway, the value of coordinated routines is hard to overstate—even if it never produces a dramatic “mission accomplished” moment.
Conclusion: the quiet work that makes a sea lane safe
Against that backdrop, the September 2025 IMO-announced framework for joint maritime operations under the DCoC/JA process deserves attention precisely because it is practical. It aims to make coordination at sea normal rather than exceptional, involving all 21 signatory states, and anchoring cooperation in routines that can outlast a news cycle. (IMO, September 2025)
The Red Sea will remain a theater where politics, security, and commerce collide. The question is whether the region can build the kind of operational cooperation that turns collision into management—and management into stability.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the “new maritime security pact” referenced in reporting?
The most concrete, authoritative “new pact/framework” tied to Red Sea–adjacent maritime security is the new framework for joint maritime operations launched under the Djibouti Code of Conduct / Jeddah Amendment (DCoC/JA) process. The IMO announced it in September 2025, describing it as a roadmap to move from policy commitments to operational cooperation at sea. (IMO, September 2025)
When and where was the framework agreed?
According to the International Maritime Organization, the framework was agreed at the inaugural meeting of Working Group 3 on Operational Cooperation and Coordination at Sea, held in Mombasa, Kenya, from 1–4 September 2025. The meeting focused on strengthening practical coordination among participating states’ maritime agencies. (IMO, September 2025)
Who is included in the framework?
The IMO said the framework includes all 21 signatory states of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. That scale matters because it suggests a broad regional base rather than a narrow coalition, with the potential for shared operating practices across multiple coastal and maritime authorities. (IMO, September 2025)
Why did Red Sea disruptions hit the global economy so hard?
Attacks and threats against commercial shipping prompted many carriers to reroute around Africa, adding time and cost. The World Shipping Council notes diversions can add up to ~17 days to voyages. Egypt also estimated about $13 billion in lost Suez Canal fees over two years as traffic fell—an indicator of the disruption’s scale. (World Shipping Council; Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
Is shipping returning to the Red Sea and Suez Canal?
Only cautiously. The Washington Post reported daily Suez transits rising from around 35 ships/day to roughly 45, still below about 70 ships/day before the crisis. The Financial Times reported Maersk made a “first structural return” of a service via Suez/Red Sea in January 2026, while analysts warned risks remained. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026; FT, Jan. 15, 2026)
What is Egypt doing to draw ships back?
Egypt has used economic incentives and services. The Washington Post reported a 15% fee discount for large vessels and added services such as crew changes and medical support. Such measures aim to improve the route’s commercial attractiveness, though carriers still weigh security risks heavily. (Washington Post, Jan. 21, 2026)
