America’s Real Security Threat Isn’t Abroad—it’s the Slow Collapse of Public Trust at Home
The U.S. can outspend rivals on defense and still be vulnerable if Americans don’t trust one another—or the institutions that must coordinate crises and legitimacy.
By TheMurrow Editorial
February 24, 2026
Key Points
- 1Track the trust collapse: Pew shows federal trust fell from 36% (2004) to 22% (Apr 2024), staying under 30% since 2008.
- 2Recognize modern threats: gray-zone competition exploits brittle legitimacy through influence ops, cyber disruption, and narratives that stall democratic decision-making.
- 3Rebuild where credibility remains: pair visible accountability with clear communication and local partners—libraries, fire departments, civic groups—to scale trust outward.
The United States spends more on national defense than any other democracy on Earth. Yet one of the country’s most consequential vulnerabilities can’t be fixed with a new weapons system or a larger budget line.
It’s the simple question of whether Americans believe one another—and their institutions—enough to cooperate when it matters.
22%
By April 2024, 22% of Americans said they trusted the federal government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time” (down from 36% in 2004, per Pew).
Over the last two decades, public trust has fallen from “a problem” to a defining condition of political life. Pew Research Center’s long-running trendline captures the arc. In 2004, 36% of Americans said they trusted the federal government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time.” By April 2024, that figure was 22%. Since 2008, Pew notes, trust has stayed below 30% almost continuously, with only brief spikes in extraordinary moments.
This isn’t merely a civic mood swing. National security doctrine increasingly treats democratic resilience and public trust as a security variable—especially in “gray-zone” competition, where adversaries pursue leverage without firing a shot. The blunt truth is hard to avoid: foreign threats land hardest when domestic trust is brittle.
Trust isn’t a civic nicety. It’s a national capability.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
Trust is becoming a national security issue—whether we like the framing or not
National security used to be discussed as the protection of borders, troops, and infrastructure from external attack. That definition still matters. Yet it no longer covers the field.
Analysts and agencies now describe a different kind of contest: influence operations, cyber disruption, and weaponized narratives designed to weaken a country from within. The Atlantic Council has warned that U.S. retreats from countering foreign information manipulation risk leaving a “dangerous vacuum,” arguing that degraded trust can fracture civil society and even affect military cohesion. That’s a sober way of saying what many Americans already sense: a nation that can’t agree on basic facts becomes easier to push around.
The key shift is conceptual. Security is increasingly tied to social cohesion and legitimacy, not only to deterrence. Citizens’ willingness to comply with public-health guidance, accept election outcomes, support alliances, or tolerate short-term sacrifice isn’t just political texture; it’s operational capacity.
Analysts and agencies now describe a different kind of contest: influence operations, cyber disruption, and weaponized narratives designed to weaken a country from within. The Atlantic Council has warned that U.S. retreats from countering foreign information manipulation risk leaving a “dangerous vacuum,” arguing that degraded trust can fracture civil society and even affect military cohesion. That’s a sober way of saying what many Americans already sense: a nation that can’t agree on basic facts becomes easier to push around.
The key shift is conceptual. Security is increasingly tied to social cohesion and legitimacy, not only to deterrence. Citizens’ willingness to comply with public-health guidance, accept election outcomes, support alliances, or tolerate short-term sacrifice isn’t just political texture; it’s operational capacity.
Gray-zone competition: the attack is the argument
Under gray-zone competition, adversaries don’t need to conquer territory. They need to create enough friction that democratic decision-making stalls.
That can look like:
- Amplifying divisive narratives online
- Probing critical infrastructure for disruptive effect
- Undermining confidence in elections and public institutions
The Atlantic Council’s framing is plain: if a country disarms in the information arena, others fill the space. The cost isn’t only misinformation. The cost is public doubt about what and whom to trust, which makes every crisis harder to manage.
That can look like:
- Amplifying divisive narratives online
- Probing critical infrastructure for disruptive effect
- Undermining confidence in elections and public institutions
The Atlantic Council’s framing is plain: if a country disarms in the information arena, others fill the space. The cost isn’t only misinformation. The cost is public doubt about what and whom to trust, which makes every crisis harder to manage.
The long decline: trust in federal government didn’t collapse overnight
If distrust were a sudden fever, the cure might be a single reform or a single election. The data suggests something closer to a chronic condition.
Pew’s trendline offers the clearest baseline. In 2004, 36% of Americans trusted the federal government to do what is right most or all of the time. By April 2024, it was 22%. Pew also finds that since 2008, fewer than 30% have expressed that level of trust for most of the period—an era spanning multiple administrations, economic shocks, a pandemic, and changing media ecosystems.
That matters because it challenges the comforting story that trust can be restored simply by removing one set of leaders. The decline appears deeper than any single scandal, president, or news cycle.
Pew’s trendline offers the clearest baseline. In 2004, 36% of Americans trusted the federal government to do what is right most or all of the time. By April 2024, it was 22%. Pew also finds that since 2008, fewer than 30% have expressed that level of trust for most of the period—an era spanning multiple administrations, economic shocks, a pandemic, and changing media ecosystems.
That matters because it challenges the comforting story that trust can be restored simply by removing one set of leaders. The decline appears deeper than any single scandal, president, or news cycle.
What trust measures—and what it doesn’t
Survey trust is not the same thing as legitimacy in the constitutional sense. Americans still vote in large numbers. Government still functions, if unevenly. Many people distrust Washington while still trusting their own mayor, school district, or local hospital.
Yet low trust changes how citizens interpret every institutional action. It increases the odds that:
- A policy disagreement becomes a suspicion of bad faith
- An error becomes evidence of corruption
- A loss becomes proof of rigging
A society can operate like that for years. In a crisis, it becomes dangerous.
Yet low trust changes how citizens interpret every institutional action. It increases the odds that:
- A policy disagreement becomes a suspicion of bad faith
- An error becomes evidence of corruption
- A loss becomes proof of rigging
A society can operate like that for years. In a crisis, it becomes dangerous.
When trust is low, every emergency becomes an argument about legitimacy.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
Conditional legitimacy: institutions are trusted depending on who controls them
The most destabilizing version of distrust isn’t “nobody believes anything.” It’s partisan conditionality—the idea that institutions are legitimate when “my side” holds power and suspect when it doesn’t.
Gallup’s July 17, 2025 release is striking on this point. Americans’ average confidence across nine institutions tracked since 1979 sits at 28% (“a great deal” or “quite a lot”). That’s near the bottom of the historical range and marks four consecutive years under 30%.
The partisan pattern is just as important as the average. Gallup noted partisan re-sorting after the presidential transition: Democrats’ average confidence fell to 26%, while Republicans’ rose to 37%. The details matter less than the direction. Trust is not merely declining; it is swinging with control.
Gallup’s July 17, 2025 release is striking on this point. Americans’ average confidence across nine institutions tracked since 1979 sits at 28% (“a great deal” or “quite a lot”). That’s near the bottom of the historical range and marks four consecutive years under 30%.
The partisan pattern is just as important as the average. Gallup noted partisan re-sorting after the presidential transition: Democrats’ average confidence fell to 26%, while Republicans’ rose to 37%. The details matter less than the direction. Trust is not merely declining; it is swinging with control.
28%
Gallup (July 2025): Americans’ average confidence across nine institutions is 28%, marking four consecutive years under 30%.
Why conditional trust is a security problem
In a high-trust environment, institutions can correct themselves. Mistakes trigger reform without triggering existential doubt. In a low-trust, conditional environment, the same correction can be read as a cover-up or a power play.
That dynamic is catnip for foreign influence operations. An adversary doesn’t need to invent a believable lie. It can simply amplify existing suspicion, pushing Americans to interpret routine institutional actions as illegitimate.
This is the modern vulnerability: a republic in which legitimacy is treated as a partisan asset rather than a shared foundation.
That dynamic is catnip for foreign influence operations. An adversary doesn’t need to invent a believable lie. It can simply amplify existing suspicion, pushing Americans to interpret routine institutional actions as illegitimate.
This is the modern vulnerability: a republic in which legitimacy is treated as a partisan asset rather than a shared foundation.
The uneven map of trust: national institutions sink, local ones endure
The story gets more interesting—and more hopeful—when you stop treating trust as a single national number.
A Bentley University–Gallup “Business in Society” survey conducted May 5–12, 2025 found that only 31% of Americans said they had “a lot” or “some” trust in the federal government to act in society’s best interest. Yet the same survey found much higher trust in charitable organizations (80%), state/local government (50%), and businesses (43%).
Local trust also shows up in the AAMC Center for Health Justice’s polling review (2021–2024). Across polls, most respondents said they trusted surveyed local institutions to serve their community fairly—over 67% across the polls—with fire departments and libraries consistently among the most trusted. The review also notes a gradual decline for 8 of 9 sectors from 2021 to 2024 (local schools were the exception), suggesting local trust is sturdy but not invulnerable.
A Bentley University–Gallup “Business in Society” survey conducted May 5–12, 2025 found that only 31% of Americans said they had “a lot” or “some” trust in the federal government to act in society’s best interest. Yet the same survey found much higher trust in charitable organizations (80%), state/local government (50%), and businesses (43%).
Local trust also shows up in the AAMC Center for Health Justice’s polling review (2021–2024). Across polls, most respondents said they trusted surveyed local institutions to serve their community fairly—over 67% across the polls—with fire departments and libraries consistently among the most trusted. The review also notes a gradual decline for 8 of 9 sectors from 2021 to 2024 (local schools were the exception), suggesting local trust is sturdy but not invulnerable.
80%
Bentley–Gallup (May 2025): 80% trust charitable organizations to act in society’s best interest (vs. 31% for the federal government).
A practical implication: rebuild from institutions people can see
National leaders often speak as if trust can be restored by a speech, a commission, or a new platform policy. The data points to another approach: anchor credibility in institutions that still have it, then scale outward.
Local “service institutions” succeed at trust for mundane reasons:
- People interact with them in person
- Performance is visible
- Ideological branding is weaker
That’s not romanticism; it’s a design lesson. Trust grows where accountability is legible.
Local “service institutions” succeed at trust for mundane reasons:
- People interact with them in person
- Performance is visible
- Ideological branding is weaker
That’s not romanticism; it’s a design lesson. Trust grows where accountability is legible.
The trust that survives is the trust people can verify.
— — TheMurrow Editorial
The governing pipeline is viewed with skepticism—especially Congress and the media
Some numbers are so stark they force clarity. The Marquette Law School Poll (Dec. 2–11, 2024) asked about “confidence” (a great deal/a lot) in prominent institutions. Results included:
- Congress: 11%
- National news media: 14%
- U.S. Supreme Court: 26%
- FBI: 32%
- Secret Service: 33%
Those are not marginal declines; they are crisis-level ratings for institutions tasked with lawmaking, information, and the rule of law. Marquette also noted a trend shift: confidence in the Supreme Court had flipped compared with 2019, when more people expressed confidence; by 2024, more reported little or no confidence.
- Congress: 11%
- National news media: 14%
- U.S. Supreme Court: 26%
- FBI: 32%
- Secret Service: 33%
Those are not marginal declines; they are crisis-level ratings for institutions tasked with lawmaking, information, and the rule of law. Marquette also noted a trend shift: confidence in the Supreme Court had flipped compared with 2019, when more people expressed confidence; by 2024, more reported little or no confidence.
11%
Marquette Law School Poll (Dec. 2024): only 11% report a great deal/a lot of confidence in Congress.
Case study: elections and infrastructure depend on belief, not only systems
No democratic function depends more on public acceptance than elections. And no modern election depends more on interconnected systems—registration databases, communications networks, power grids, logistics, poll worker staffing, and post-election transparency.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) underscores this interconnectedness in its 2025–2026 international strategic planning: infrastructure dependencies, rapid information sharing, and cross-border standards are part of resilience. Read closely, the message is not purely technical. The public has to believe accurate alerts, trust guidance, and accept verified outcomes.
That’s why “election security” can’t be siloed as a tech problem. If citizens assume the referees are corrupt, even perfect systems won’t produce public peace.
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) underscores this interconnectedness in its 2025–2026 international strategic planning: infrastructure dependencies, rapid information sharing, and cross-border standards are part of resilience. Read closely, the message is not purely technical. The public has to believe accurate alerts, trust guidance, and accept verified outcomes.
That’s why “election security” can’t be siloed as a tech problem. If citizens assume the referees are corrupt, even perfect systems won’t produce public peace.
Youth trust is the early warning light—and it’s flashing
Older Americans sometimes dismiss low trust as a phase—something young people will outgrow as they settle into careers, families, and mortgages. The data suggests caution.
The Harvard Kennedy School Youth Poll, as reported by Politico on April 23, 2025, found that among Americans aged 18–29, only 19% trust the federal government to do the right thing most of the time.
Youth distrust matters for two reasons. First, it predicts the long-term baseline: today’s 25-year-old is tomorrow’s 45-year-old voter, juror, soldier, teacher, and manager. Second, younger Americans are immersed in a fragmented information ecosystem where institutional claims compete with countless alternatives.
The Harvard Kennedy School Youth Poll, as reported by Politico on April 23, 2025, found that among Americans aged 18–29, only 19% trust the federal government to do the right thing most of the time.
Youth distrust matters for two reasons. First, it predicts the long-term baseline: today’s 25-year-old is tomorrow’s 45-year-old voter, juror, soldier, teacher, and manager. Second, younger Americans are immersed in a fragmented information ecosystem where institutional claims compete with countless alternatives.
19%
Harvard Kennedy School Youth Poll (reported April 2025): only 19% of Americans aged 18–29 trust the federal government to do the right thing most of the time.
Multiple perspectives: skepticism can be healthy—until it breaks coordination
A fair reading requires acknowledging the upside of skepticism. Distrust can be a response to real failures. It can push transparency, expose abuse, and prevent complacency.
The problem is not skepticism. The problem is incapacity—when distrust becomes so reflexive that collective action fails even in matters where interests align. Public health offers one example: guidance can become a referendum on identity rather than evidence. Disaster response offers another: warnings are less useful if half the population assumes they’re politically motivated.
The security implication is straightforward. A society that cannot coordinate under stress becomes easier to destabilize—by enemies abroad or by opportunists at home.
The problem is not skepticism. The problem is incapacity—when distrust becomes so reflexive that collective action fails even in matters where interests align. Public health offers one example: guidance can become a referendum on identity rather than evidence. Disaster response offers another: warnings are less useful if half the population assumes they’re politically motivated.
The security implication is straightforward. A society that cannot coordinate under stress becomes easier to destabilize—by enemies abroad or by opportunists at home.
What rebuilding trust could look like: competence, transparency, and local credibility
No single reform restores legitimacy. Trust is cumulative; so is distrust. Still, the research points toward pragmatic levers—especially ones that rely on institutions with remaining credibility.
Practical takeaways for policymakers and civic leaders
A trust strategy that treats trust as national capability would prioritize:
- Radical clarity in communication: fewer speculative claims; more explainers about what is known, unknown, and changing.
- Visible accountability: fast, public correction of errors; clear consequences for misconduct.
- Local partnerships: use high-trust institutions—libraries, fire departments, local civic groups—as relays for accurate information during emergencies.
- Cross-institution coordination: CISA’s emphasis on rapid information sharing and standards implies a lesson: the public experiences government as a system, not as a set of silos.
- Radical clarity in communication: fewer speculative claims; more explainers about what is known, unknown, and changing.
- Visible accountability: fast, public correction of errors; clear consequences for misconduct.
- Local partnerships: use high-trust institutions—libraries, fire departments, local civic groups—as relays for accurate information during emergencies.
- Cross-institution coordination: CISA’s emphasis on rapid information sharing and standards implies a lesson: the public experiences government as a system, not as a set of silos.
Trust strategy levers to prioritize
- ✓Radical clarity in communication
- ✓Visible accountability
- ✓Local partnerships with high-trust institutions
- ✓Cross-institution coordination and rapid information sharing
The media’s responsibility—and its constraint
The Marquette number for national news media (14% confidence) is a warning label. Yet it also points to a paradox: the press is asked to verify claims in a low-trust environment where verification itself is politicized.
A more durable media strategy would lean into:
- Transparent sourcing and methods
- Clear separation of reporting and commentary
- Corrections that are prominent, not buried
None of this guarantees persuasion. It does make it harder for bad actors—foreign or domestic—to portray every correction as a conspiracy.
A more durable media strategy would lean into:
- Transparent sourcing and methods
- Clear separation of reporting and commentary
- Corrections that are prominent, not buried
None of this guarantees persuasion. It does make it harder for bad actors—foreign or domestic—to portray every correction as a conspiracy.
Key Insight
Trust functions like infrastructure: it determines whether institutions can coordinate people under stress. Without it, even competent systems struggle to produce legitimacy.
The national security lesson: foreign threats succeed when domestic trust is brittle
Security professionals often speak in the language of capabilities: force readiness, cyber defense, supply chains. Trust belongs on that list, not as a moral aspiration but as functional capacity.
The Atlantic Council’s warning about a “dangerous vacuum” in countering foreign information manipulation is best read as a systems diagnosis. Influence operations thrive where legitimacy is already conditional and institutions are already suspected. CISA’s planning emphasis on interdependencies and information sharing echoes the same premise from a different angle: resilience requires coordination, and coordination requires belief.
The American challenge isn’t to manufacture unity or silence disagreement. Democracy is supposed to argue. The challenge is to protect a shared floor: enough confidence in procedures, enough respect for evidence, enough willingness to lose a vote without concluding the country is irredeemably rigged.
That floor is the difference between a hard election and a crisis of regime legitimacy. It’s also the difference between absorbing a foreign information operation and amplifying it.
The country doesn’t need naïve trust. It needs earned trust—the kind built through competence, transparency, and institutions that people experience as real.
The Atlantic Council’s warning about a “dangerous vacuum” in countering foreign information manipulation is best read as a systems diagnosis. Influence operations thrive where legitimacy is already conditional and institutions are already suspected. CISA’s planning emphasis on interdependencies and information sharing echoes the same premise from a different angle: resilience requires coordination, and coordination requires belief.
The American challenge isn’t to manufacture unity or silence disagreement. Democracy is supposed to argue. The challenge is to protect a shared floor: enough confidence in procedures, enough respect for evidence, enough willingness to lose a vote without concluding the country is irredeemably rigged.
That floor is the difference between a hard election and a crisis of regime legitimacy. It’s also the difference between absorbing a foreign information operation and amplifying it.
The country doesn’t need naïve trust. It needs earned trust—the kind built through competence, transparency, and institutions that people experience as real.
Editor's Note
The goal isn’t blind faith or forced unity. The article argues for earned trust—built through competence, transparency, and verifiable local credibility.
T
About the Author
TheMurrow Editorial is a writer for TheMurrow covering opinion.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why are analysts linking public trust to national security?
Because modern competition often happens below the threshold of war. Influence operations, cyber disruption, and polarizing narratives aim to weaken a society’s ability to coordinate. When trust is low, citizens are less likely to follow guidance in crises, accept election outcomes, or support alliances—reducing national resilience even if military capacity remains strong.
How low is trust in the federal government right now?
Pew trendlines show a long decline. In 2004, 36% trusted the federal government to do what is right most or all of the time. By April 2024, that was 22%. Pew also reports that since 2008, trust has generally remained below 30%, indicating a persistent, not temporary, problem.
Are Americans losing trust in all institutions equally?
No. Gallup and other surveys show uneven trust. A May 2025 Bentley University–Gallup survey found only 31% trust the federal government to act in society’s best interest, while charitable organizations drew 80% trust and state/local government 50%. Local “service institutions” often remain more credible than national ones.
What does “conditional legitimacy” mean?
It describes trust that changes based on which party controls institutions. Gallup’s July 2025 report found Americans’ average confidence across nine institutions at 28%, with Democrats’ average confidence falling to 26% and Republicans’ rising to 37% after a presidential transition. The risk is that institutions become seen as legitimate only when they serve one side.
Which institutions are viewed most skeptically?
The Marquette Law School Poll (Dec. 2024) found very low confidence in Congress (11%) and national news media (14%), with higher but still modest confidence in the Supreme Court (26%), FBI (32%), and Secret Service (33%). These figures suggest skepticism across the governing pipeline: lawmaking, information, and enforcement.
Why does youth trust matter so much?
It’s an early indicator of future baselines. The Harvard Kennedy School Youth Poll (reported April 2025) found only 19% of Americans aged 18–29 trust the federal government to do the right thing most of the time. If those attitudes persist, institutional legitimacy problems could deepen over time as younger cohorts become the core electorate.
